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Abstract
This paper evaluates welfare under optimal monetary and ﬁscal pol-
icy in a dynamic stochastic model of currency substitution and capital.
It shows that in a partially dollarized economy, the main optimal policy
results, i.e. the Friedman Rule and the zero capital tax, hold. Welfare im-
plications of these optimal policies are computed for the Bolivian economy
using a second-order approximation technique. The primary conclusions
are that the welfare gains under optimal monetary policy are negligible.
The welfare gains when optimal ﬁscal policy is considered alone or in
conjunction with optimal monetary policy are sizable and come from the
increase in real variables and also by the increase in real balances in local
currency. Thus, welfare gains are negatively related to dollarization.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
We already know a fair amount about optimal ﬁscal and monetary policy for
a single-currency economy, but some countries face, for various reasons partial
dollarization. Are the optimal policy lessons related to taxes and nominal in-
terest rates also valid for this type of economies? This is an important question
that I answer in a dynamic stochastic model of currency substitution and capi-
tal. I stress the word capital, since most of the papers do not introduce capital
when they are analyzing optimal monetary policy. Kydland and Prescott [16]
emphasized investment dynamics as an important channel for the transmission
of aggregate disturbances, so it is natural to believe capital accumulation should
play a role in shaping optimal ﬁscal and monetary policies.1
Other important issues that have not been analyzed much are the wel-
fare implications related to performing optimal policies in partially dollarized
economies. It is clear that policies that are optimal or near their optimal level
will be welfare improving, but how large or small these welfare gains could be
in a partially dollarized economy is a question that has not been answered yet.
Compared with the existing literature, this paper shows that the welfare gains
are small under optimal monetary policy, but are sizable under optimal ﬁscal
policy. These gains are primarily driven by real balances in local currency.
The welfare gains of shifting from current policies to the optimal policy,
refer to the fraction of consumption from the benchmark or current regime
that a household would be willing to receive to be compensated for being in
that regime and not in the optimal policy regime. I compute the welfare gains
associated with optimal policies using the second-order approximation technique
developed by Schmitt Grohé and Uribe [24].
Welfare gains based on an evaluation of the utility function have not previ-
ously been computed for partially dollarized economies, this is the ﬁrst time that
such comparisons are performed. Cavalcanti and Villamil [3] consider currency
substitution in a monetary model with transactions technology, and compute
welfare gains associated with optimal monetary policies; but, they choose a
standard calibration using the U.S. economy as a baseline. Clearly there are big
diﬀerences between an economy where two monies are used in transactions and
the U.S. economy, which is a single currency country.
The papers closer to this work are those of Cavalcanti and Villamil [3] men-
tioned above, and Vegh [28], but they only use monetary models with transac-
tions technology. This paper contributes to the dollarization literature by using
a two-monies-in-the-utility-function model (2MIUF model) to handle monetary
and ﬁscal policy issues. Cavalcanti and Villamil [3] introduce currency substitu-
tion as a market distortion similar to the existence of an informal sector, where
markets are incomplete. Here, I introduce dollarization to the model as a shock
to the economy. Dollars circulate in the economy and are part of the aggregate
demand. The results show that there are some diﬀerences in welfare, whenThe
one is considering two monies in the utility function.2
1Schmitt Grohé and Uribe ([25]) note also this notable simpliﬁcation.
2In fact, few papers analyze dollarization in a general equilibrium context, see Moron and
2Recent research about optimal ﬁscal and monetary policy has concentrated
on introducing nominal rigidities and imperfect competition to this type of mod-
els.3 My model constitutes a revisit to the beginning of this literature, because
all the recent models share a characteristic, they do not have capital accumu-
lation. It is important to introduce it, especially if we want to see the welfare
eﬀects of ﬁscal policies under distortionary taxes on capital income.
The building blocks of my model come from the literature of optimal ﬁscal
and monetary policies, which is a mixture of the public ﬁnance and the general
equilibrium traditions. In this manner, I characterize optimal allocations as
solutions of a simple programming problem (the Ramsey problem) and I am
particularly interested in the solutions and the associated policies which are
called the Ramsey allocations. This is done in the theoretical part of the model.
In the empirical part, I do not compute the model with Ramsey policies, instead
I assume a benchmark economy and see what happens if this economy shifts
to optimal policies. I am interested specially in seeing the magnitudes of the
welfare gains associated with these policies.
The foremost theoretical result is that the two major results related to op-
timal policies, i.e, the Friedman Rule and the zero tax on capital income hold
also for partially dollarized economies without modiﬁcations. As Chari, et. al.
[8], assuming homotheticity in the utility function, I show that the optimality
of the Friedman Rule holds. This is not a necessary assumption, as it is shown
in the numerical example.4
The principal ﬁnding, as it relates to ﬁscal policy, has been that capital
taxes should be zero if a steady-state Ramsey allocation exists (see Chamley [5]).
Certainly, this is a steady-state result, and in the theoretical section, it is proved
in that context. But Chari and Kehoe [4] show that keeping capital income tax
rates close to zero after period 1 is also optimal. In the numerical simulations,
I show that the same is true for a partially dollarized economy, since all real
variables are improved by setting income capital tax to zero. Furthermore the
level of dollarization is reduced.
I have calibrated the model for the Bolivian economy, which is a partially
dollarized economy. I assume that the monetary policy is implemented by a
simple policy rule -the Taylor Rule- where the Monetary Authority sets a target
for the inﬂation rate. The ﬁscal policy is implemented through constant capital
and labor income taxes.
Welfare gains in terms of permanent consumption associated with optimal
policies are computed using a second-order approximation to the policy func-
tion. The main ﬁnding is that by setting the capital tax to zero, the Bolivian
economy experiments an important welfare gain of 3.65 percent of permanent
consumption. Welfare gains related to optimal ﬁscal policy have never been
computed for a partially dollarized economy, but for example Chari, et.al.[7]
Winkelried [2] and Mendoza [20].
3S e eS c h m i t t - G r o h ea n dU r i b e[ 2 2 ]a n d[ 2 3 ] ,C o r r e i aet. al. [11], and Correia and Teles
[10].
4Cavalcanti and Villamil[3] ﬁnd that the Friedman Rule is not the optimal monetary policy
when the transactions cost function is homogeneous of degree one or greater.
3ﬁnd gains of 1.6 percent for a model with high risk aversion and 6.1 percent for
an economy with high initial debt. Here, welfare gains come from the fact that
consumption, leisure and especially real balances in local money increase as a
consequence of the reduction of the capital tax to zero. All these variables are
arguments of the utility function.
Morales [21] states that more understanding is needed on the optimal policies
for Central Banks in partially dollarized economies, so I analyze welfare eﬀects
associated with a reduction in the yearly inﬂation target from 5 percent to 2
percent. The welfare gains associated with this policy are in the order of 0.0084
percent. Cooley and Hansen [9] estimate the welfare gains from eliminating
moderate inﬂation and they ﬁnd that they are in the order of 0.4-0.6 percent.
The model shows that money is super neutral, and in this case, the increase in
welfare comes solely by the increase of the real balances in local money.
I also compute welfare gains associated with the implementation, at the same
time, of both optimal ﬁscal and monetary policy. The results show that agents
obtain welfare gains in the order of 3.66 percent of permanent consumption. In
this case it is clearly seen that these gains are mainly driven by the reduction of
the capital tax to zero. The real variables in the economy change in the same
magnitude as when only optimal ﬁscal policy was implemented, and so welfare
gains are very similar. The impact of reducing the inﬂation target to 2 percent
is negligible.
In the three exercises, I ﬁnd that there are no diﬀerences between welfare
gains computed with the ﬁrst-order approximation and the second-order approx-
imation technique. This means that volatilities do not have welfare implications
in the Bolivian economy. The main parameter in explaining welfare is the share
that monies have in the utility function. Therefore, I perform a sensitivity
analysis with this parameter and ﬁnd a negative relation between dollarization
and welfare gains. As dollarization increases, the welfare gains decrease, and
this relation is more pronounced if ﬁscal policy is being considered.
The remainder of the paper is organized in ﬁve sections. Section 2 describes
the structure of the model. Section 3 presents the Ramsey problem and the pri-
mal approach to solve it. In section 4, the main theoretical results are provided
and proved. Section 5 establishes the calibration of the Bolivian economy and I
compute the welfare gains associated to optimal policies using the second-order
approximation technique. Finally section 6 oﬀers the concluding remarks.
2 The Model
In this section, I develop a simple dynamic stochastic model of currency substitu-
tion and capital. My model is an extension of the monies-in-the-utility-function
in a small open economy literature developed by Imrohoroglu [12] and Can-
zoneri and Diba [1]. I capture a real world situation where in some countries
two monies compete against each other to provide liquidity services. A way to
capture this fact is by introducing these two monies (pesos and dollars) in the
utility function, where agents have preferences for using both monies. In other
4words domestic money and dollars share the same privileges and thus aﬀect
u t i l i t yi nt h es a m em a n n e r . 5
Cavalcanti and Villamil [3] use a model where pesos and dollars enter into a
transactions technology. That is another form to introduce partially dollariza-
tion into the economy, but more diﬃcult to analyze numerically, so that is why
my model is more suitable to analyze policy and welfare implications.
Monies enter in the utility function with a weight (the elasticity of substitu-
tion), which will be higher for the foreign currency, if the country is dollarized.
Other arguments in the utility function are consumption and leisure. Firms use
capital and labor to produce goods and the government ﬁnances an exogenous
stream of purchases by levying distortionary labor and capital taxes, printing
local money, and issuing one-period nominally risk-free bonds.
There is an inﬁnitely lived representative household living in a single-good,





t u(ct,m t,d t,l t) (1)
where β ∈ (0,1), ct ≥ 0 and lt ≥ 0 denote consumption and leisure at
time t respectively; u(·) is strictly concave and twice continuously diﬀerentiable.
Because of the timing in the story underlying the money-in-utility reduced form,
Id e ﬁne mt =
Mt+1
Pt as the real balances in local currency held in period t for
period t +1 ;a n ddt =
εtDt+1
Pt as the real balances in dollars.6
With one unit of time per period, households divide it between leisure lt and
labor nt.
1=lt + nt (2)
The single good is produced with capital kt and labor nt. The output can be
consumed by households, used by the government, used to augment the capital
stock, or used to be traded for dollars in an international market. The economy
feasibility constraint is given by:






≤ AtF(kt,n t)+( 1− δ)kt (3)
where δ ∈ (0,1) is the rate at which capital depreciates, gt is an exogenous
sequence of government purchases that will be aﬀected by shocks and where
there are also going to be technological shocks At. The production function
F(kt,n t) is standard concave and exhibits constant returns to scale.
5As it is typical in a partially dollarized economy, dollars serve as medium of exchange,
value reserve and unit of account.
6In a cash-in-hand model we deﬁne mt = Mt
Pt and dt = Dt
P∗
t
because agents purchase goods
within each period.
52.1 Present Value Budget Constraint




















t)rtkt +( 1− τn
t )wtnt +( 1− δ)kt
The left-hand side represents the use of funds, and the right-hand side mea-
sures the resources at the household’s disposal. It is important to note that it
is the interest rate on bonds deﬁned the period before; rt i st h er e n t a lr a t eo f
capital; τk
t is the tax on capital income, τn
t is the tax on labor income and wt
is the wage rate.
After consolidating two consecutive budget constraints given by equation










































t)rtkt +( 1− δ)kt +( 1− τn




where I have imposed the following no-arbitrage condition to ensure the exis-





















































If condition (6) is violated, the household can make its budget set unbounded
by either buying an arbitrarily large kt+1 when the left-hand side is bigger than
the right-hand side, or, in the opposite case, by selling capital short with an
arbitrarily large negative kt+1.
By continuing the process of recursively using successive budget constraints






t [ct + Itmt + I∗


































In each period, the representative ﬁrm takes (rt,w t) as given and rents capital
and labor from households to maximize proﬁts,
max
{kt,nt}
Π = AtF(kt,n t) − rtkt − wtnt
The ﬁrst order conditions for this problem are:
rt = AtFk(kt,n t) (8)
wt = AtFn(kt,n t) (9)
2.3 Government
The government ﬁnances its expenditure stream gt by levying ﬂat-rate time-
varying taxes on earnings from capital at rate τk
t and from labor at rate τn
t .
The government might also trade one-period bonds and print domestic money










3T h e R a m s e y P r o b l e m
The general approach to characterizing competitive equilibrium with distorting
taxes is known in the public ﬁnance literature as the primal approach to optimal
taxation or to the Ramsey problem. The basic idea is to eliminate all prices and
taxes so that the government can be thought of as directly choosing a feasible
allocation, subject to constraints that ensure the existence of prices and taxes
such that the chosen allocation is consistent with the optimization behavior of
households and ﬁrms.
The primal approach, as opposed to the dual approach in which tax rates
are viewed as governmental decision, emphasizes the solution of the Ramsey
problem. In contrast, the dual approach (see Lucas and Stockey [18]) emphasizes
the solution of the household’s problem, more in the style of a typical Real
Business Cycle (RBC) model.
3.1 Deﬁnitions
I start this section giving some deﬁnitions, which are important for the rest of
the paper.
7Deﬁnition 1 A feasible allocation is a sequence ({kt},{ct},{nt},{dt},{gt}
and {At}) that satisﬁes equation (3).
Deﬁnition 2 A price system is a 6-tuple of nonnegative bounded sequences
({wt},{rt},{it},{εt},{Rt} and {Pt}).






t },{Bt} and {Mt}) rep-
resent a government policy.7
Deﬁnition 4 A competitive equilibrium is a feasible allocation, a price system,
and a government policy such that (a) given the price system and the government
policy, the allocation solves both the ﬁrm’s problem and the household’s problem;
and (b) given the allocation and the price system, the government policy satisﬁes
t h es e q u e n c eo fg o v e r n m e n tb u d g e tc o n s t r a i n t s( 1 0 ) .
There are many competitive equilibrium indexed by diﬀerent government
policies. This multiplicity motivates the Ramsey problem.
Deﬁnition 5 Given M0, D0, B0, k0 and P0 the Ramsey Problem is to choose
a competitive equilibrium that maximizes expression (1).
According to the technology constraint (3), capital is reversible and can be
transformed back into the consumption good. Thus, the capital stock is a ﬁxed
factor only one period at a time, so τk
0 is the only tax that we need to restrict
to ensure a closed form solution to the Ramsey problem. These bounds play
an important role in shaping the near-term temporal properties of the optimal
tax plan, as discussed by Chamley[5] and explored computationally by Jones,
Manuelli and Rossi[13].
3.2 The Primal Approach of the Ramsey Problem





t [ct + Itmt + I∗

















One advantage of the primal approach is that it is better organized. The
basic idea of the primal approach is to recast the issue of choosing optimal taxes
and interest rates as a problem of choosing allocations subject to constraints
which capture the restrictions on the type of allocations that can be supported
as a competitive equilibrium for some choice of taxes and prices.
I develop the Ramsey problem in four steps as in Ljungqvist and Sargent
[17].
7Mt will not be part of a government policy if we are considering a Taylor Rule.
83.2.1 Constructing the Ramsey plan
Step 1: Let λ be a Lagrange multiplier on the household’s budget constraint



























Proﬁt maximization and factor market equilibrium imply equations (8) and
(9).




























t [uc(t)ct + um(t)mt + ud(t)dt − un(t)nt] − W0 =0 (16)













This equation is called the "implementability constraint". Notice that it is
written with equality. The constraint in the consumer problem is an inequal-
ity because of free disposal but under non-satiation, consumers must optimally
choose (in CE) to satisfy their budget constraint with equality. Hence in the gov-
ernment´s implementability problem, the consumer’s present value constraint
must hold with equality.
Looking at (16), people could think that it is optimal for the government to
choose a very large P0 to reduce M0/P0 to relax the implementability constraint.
Any manipulation of prices at period 0 would reduce the need for distortionary
taxation later on. This is also another way of describing the inﬂation tax.
To eliminate these possibilities, it can be assumed that all variables in period
zero are equal to 0.
9Step 3: The Ramsey problem consists in maximizing expression (1) subject to
equation (16) which is called the implementability constraint and the feasibility
constraint (3). The implementability constraint can be thought of as a consumer
budget constraint with both the taxes and the prices substituted out by using
ﬁrst-order conditions.
I assume that the government expenditures are small enough so that the










t [uc(t)ct + um(t)mt + ud(t)dt − un(t)nt] − W0 =0
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AtF(kt,n t) − (1 − δ)kt
#
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     
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(17)
−ΦW0
where Φ and θt are the Lagrange multipliers on the two constraints respec-
tively.
Deﬁne V (ct,m t,d t,1−nt,Φ)=u ( ct,m t,d t,1−nt)+Φ[uc(t)ct + um(t)mt + ud(t)dt − un(t)nt],







V (ct,m t,d t,1 − nt,Φ) − θt
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First-order conditions for this problem are:
ct : Vc(t) − θt =0
nt : −Vn(t) − θt [−AtFn(t)] = 0
mt : Vm(t)=0
ft : β




















Vc(t)=βEtVc(t +1 )[ At+1Fk(t +1 )+1− δ] (22)
To these we add the feasibility and implementability constraints and seek
an allocation {ct,m t,d t,n t,k t}
∞
t=0 and a multiplier Φ that satisﬁes the system
of diﬀerence equations formed by (19)-(??), (3) and (16).
One important diﬀerence is introduced in the model because of the inclusion
of a second currency in the economy. This can be seen in equation (21). Notice
that this equation not only involves real variables, it also involves the inﬂation
rate Pt+1/Pt and the rate of devaluation εt+1/εt. This could impose some
complications in closing the model, but I delay this discussion until section 3.5,
where I present the model with functional forms.
Step 4: After an allocation has been found, we obtain the prices from equa-
tions (12)-(14).
4 Theoretical Results
In this section, I show that the main theoretical results related to optimal ﬁscal
and monetary policy in a single-currency economy with capital, also apply to this
2MIUF partially dollarized economy. In general, a government facing a partially
dollarized economy should follow the same optimal policies as a government in
a non-dollarized economy. Dollars and the domestic currency are both neutral
and the former are part of the aggregate demand. This could be interpreted as
the current account of the economy or as a vintage capital. Perhaps the latter
is better as this is a closed economy model.
4.1 The Friedman Rule
The main result related to optimal monetary policy is the so called Friedman
Rule.8 This rule states that the optimal policy is to satiate the economy with
real balances by generating a deﬂation that drives the net nominal interest rate
to zero. In a stationary economy, there can be deﬂation only if the government
retires currency with a government surplus (see Ljungqvist and Sargent [17]).
We now ask if such a costly scheme remains optimal when all government
revenues must be raised through distortionary taxation in an economy where
there are two types of real balances and capital. The answer is yes, and I prove
this result as in Chari, et.al.[8], i.e I am going to assume that preferences satisfy
homotheticity and separability conditions.
u(ct,m t,d t,1 − nt)=U(H(ct,m t,d t),1 − nt) (23)
8The optimality of the Friedman Rule is also a characteristic of the "optimum quantity"
of money.
11where H is homothetic.
Proposition 1 If the utility function is of the form (23), then the Friedman
rule is optimal.
Proof. F r o ms t e p3a b o v e ,w ek n o wt h a tVm(t)=0and Vc(t)=θt.T h e s e
ﬁrst-order conditions imply:
(1 + Φ)u m(t)+Φ[ucm(t)ct + umm(t)mt + udm(t)dt − unm(t)nt]=0
(1 + Φ)u c(t)+Φ[ucc(t)ct + umc(t)mt + udc(t)dt − unc(t)nt]=θt
the assumption of homotheticity (see appendix A for details) allows us to write
these two equations as:
Hm [(1 + Φ)UH + Φ(UHHH − UHnn)] = 0 (24)
Hc [(1 + Φ)UH + Φ(UHHH − UHnn)] = θt (25)







and then by (13), we have It =0 ,s oit+1 =0 .
Clearly, this result comes from the assumption made about preferences, but
restricting H to be homogeneous does not reduce the generality of the result.
Corollary 1 Under the Friedman Rule Rt+1 = Pt/Pt+1.
Proof. The proof is trivial. It is deﬁned Rt+1 ≡ (1+it+1) Pt
Pt+1 as the gross
nominal interest rate. Optimality of the Friedman Rule means it+1 =0 ,s ot h e
result is straight forward.
This result is saying that along the optimal path, money and capital yield
the same return. It can be seen again that it+1 < 0 cannot hold in equilibrium.
If it+1 were negative, domestic money would yield a higher return than capital
but then the household would not hold any capital. If no one holds capital,
however, the return on capital would be inﬁnitely high, which contradicts the
assumption that local currency yields a higher return than capital.
Then, the no-arbitrage condition (??) ensures that capital and bonds have
the same rate of return. In sum, capital, bonds and money share the same
return in the economy.
4.2 Zero Capital Tax
The most important result on optimal ﬁscal policy is the zero capital tax.9 This
is a steady-state result, ﬁrst proved by Chamley [5] and applied in a variety
9Smoothing of taxes on labor income is also an important result in the literature concerning
optimal taxation (see Chari, et.al.[7]).
12of circumstances. Sometimes one can establish a much stronger result, namely
that optimal capital income taxes are close to zero after only a few periods.
Chari and Kehoe [4] show that keeping capital income tax rates close to zero
after period 1 is also optimal.
Proposition 2 If there exists a steady-state Ramsey allocation, the associated
limiting tax rate on capital is zero.
Proof. Consider the special case in which there is a T ≥ 0 for which gt = g
for all t ≥ T. Assume there exists a solution to the Ramsey problem, and that









=( Fk +1− δ) (26)
using A =1 .


































(1 − τk)Fk +1− δ
¤
(27)
Comparing equations (26) and (27) gives us the condition: τk =0 .
Clearly, the government could have the incentive to tax capital at period 0
and then ﬁx the tax rate to zero. The following corollary shows this possibility.
Corollary 2 (Taxation of Initial Capital) A government can reduce its need to
rely on future distortionary taxation by taxing capital at period zero.
Proof. We have shown that τk =0in steady-state. Let’s suppose that
the government can choose τk







which is strictly positive for all τk
0 as long as Φ > 0.
The intuition is very simple, by raising τk
0, the government reduces its need
to rely on future distortionary taxation, and hence the value of Φ falls.10 In fact,
the implication of this result is that the government should raise all revenues
through a time 0 capital levy, then lend the proceeds to the private sector and
ﬁnance government expenditures by using the interests from the loan; this would
enable the government to set τl
t =0for all t ≥ 0 and τk
t =0for all t ≥ 1.
To eliminate this possibility, I assume that the capital tax rate in period
zero is equal to 0.
10Recall that Φ measures the utility costs of raising government revenues through distorting
taxes.
135 Welfare in a Partially Dollarized Economy
In this section, I calculate the welfare gains of shifting from current policies to
optimal ﬁscal and monetary policies in a real economy case. For this task, I
calibrate the model for the Bolivian economy, which is a nice and clear example
of a partially dollarized economy.
The solution to the dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium model is ap-
proximated using the second-order approximation method proposed by Schmitt-
Grohé and Uribe [24]. I also compute ﬁrst-order approximations and show that
for this case, there are no diﬀerences between the ﬁrst and second-order approx-
imations. Second-order terms or volatilities are not important for the welfare
comparisons exposed in this section.11
It is obvious to expect welfare gains when going from normal policies to
optimal policies. As this is a model with two-monies-in-the-utility function, this
appears to be an important issue in explaining the welfare gains from optimal
policies. I ﬁnd important welfare gains of shifting to an optimal ﬁscal policy
regime, but not to an optimal monetary policy regime.
5.1 The Welfare Measure
I use the same methodology to measure welfare cost (gain) as Schmitt-Grohé
and Uribe [25]. I measure welfare as the conditional expectation of lifetime
utility as of time zero, that is,





















t are the contingent plans for consumption, domestic money,
dollars and leisure, respectively.
I compute the welfare cost of a particular ﬁscal regime relative to the op-
timized rule as follows: Consider two policy regimes, a reference policy regime
denoted by r and an alternative policy regime denoted by a.T h i s a l t e r n a t i v e
regime will be of course, the optimal regime. So, I deﬁne two welfare measures
associated with both regimes using equation (??), where j = r,a.
Let λ denote the welfare cost of adopting the optimal regime a instead of the
reference policy regime r.Im e a s u r eλ as the fraction of regime r’s consumption
process that a household would be willing to give up to be as well oﬀ under











11Kim and Kim [14] ﬁnd the opposite, linear methods are so inaccurate as to generate even
spurious welfare reversals.
145.2 Calibration
I compute a second-order-approximation to the policy function around the non-
stochastic steady state of the model. The coeﬃcients of the approximated policy
functions are themselves functions of the deep structural and policy parameters
of the model. Therefore, one must assign numerical values to these parameters.
I calibrate the model for the Bolivian economy using quarterly data for the
period 1990-2005. The utility function is given by:










T h et i m ec o n s t r a i n ti sg i v e nb y :
lt + nt =1 (31)





where A is the stochastic component of the production function and follows an
AR(1) process of the type:
ln(At+1)=A0 + ρA ln(At)+σAεA
t+1 (33)










t +(1−δ)kt t =0 ,1,...
(34)
where I assume that gt is also stochastic and follows the following process:
ln(gt+1)=G + ρg ln(gt)+σgε
g
t+1 (35)











































































In order to close the system, I assume that the monetary policy instrument
is the nominal interest rate it and it responds to movements in inﬂation and the
output gap. In other words I assume a simple Taylor rule of the type:












I assumed that dollars can be obtained in the international market. A simple
way to treat this issue is to assume that dollars follow a law of movement:
ln(dt+1)=ξ1 + ρd ln(dt)+σdεd
t+1 (38)
At a steady-state, these conditions yield12









































n1−α +( 1− δ)k (44)
ln(1 + i)=
ξ0
1 − ρi (45)
ln(d)=
ξ1
1 − ρd (46)
ln(g)=
G
1 − ρg (47)
ln(g)=
A0
1 − ρA (48)
Table 1 summarizes the calibrated parameters of the Bolivian economy.
Some of them are structural parameters and some are policy parameters.
12Assuming that the tax rates are constant at τk
t = τk and τn
t = τn.
16Table 1: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Value Description
β 0.9844 Utility discount factor
α 1/3 Capital share in production function
δ 0.0194 Depreciation rate
σ 2 Risk aversion coeﬃcient
θ 0.2636 Dollarizaton parameter (weight of local money in the utility function)
ϕ 0.005 Currencies weight parameter
γ -1.96 Leisure intertemporal elasticity of substitution (Frish labor elasticity)
G -4.66 Government spending constant
A0 -0.24 Productivity shock constant
ξ0 0.0066 Taylor Rule constant
ξ1 0.1787 Dollar’s law of movement constant
ρi 0.762278 Autocorrelation coeﬃcient of the Taylor Rule
ρA 0.8 Autocorrelation coeﬃcient of the productivity shock
ρg -0.359996 Autocorrelation coeﬃcient of the government shock
ρd 0.773070 Autocorrelation coeﬃcient of dollars
σi 0.011645 Standard deviation to the Taylor Rule
σA 0.019 Standard deviation of the innovation to the productivity shock
σg 0.037334 Standard deviation to the innovation to the spending shock
σd 0.037037 Standard deviation to dollars
η 0.012638 Output parameter in the Taylor Rule
φ 0.056026 Inﬂation parameter in the Taylor Rule
I assign a value of 0.9844 to the subjective discount factor β, which is consis-
tent with an annual real rate of interest of 6.51 percent. The capital share in the
production function α has been taken from Quiroz, et.al.[26].13 The parameters
of the shock variables for g and d have been estimated with the corresponding
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions. In the same way, the parameters ρi,
η, φ and σi of the Taylor Rule have been estimated by OLS where the nominal
interest rate is deﬁned by the discount rate of thirteen weeks Treasury Bills
(LT’s). The potential output, used in the regression, has been identiﬁed us-
ing a Hodrick Prescott ﬁlter. The depreciation rate δ is a standard value for
quarterly data and corresponds to an annual rate of 8%. The currencies weight
parameter ϕ is taken from Walsh [29] and primarily relates both currencies with
consumption..
I calibrate σ, γ, θ, ξ0 and ξ1 to match some real ratios for the Bolivian
economy. Those ratios and their corresponding real values are shown in table
2. Notice, that all values are very close to the values from the data, therefore
this assures that this economy is the Bolivian economy.14
13Quiroz,et.al.[26] present the ﬁrst RBC model calibrated for Bolivia
14The parameter σA has been calibrated to match the volatility of output.
17Table 2: Calibrated Values
Variable SS Value Data Description
n 0.6209 0.62 Global Participation Rate (TPG)15
c/y 0.73113 0.7315 Consumption share over GDP
g/y 0.11051 0.1122 Government spending share over GDP
INV/y 0.15951 0.1576 Investment share over GDP
d/(m + d) 0.83258 0.8279 Dollars over total money
Notice that investment (INV) is equal to δk and in the data it is referred to
"Formación Bruta de Capital" which is investment in the National Accounts.
For the local money, I use the monetary aggregate M3 and for the dollars, the
diﬀerence between M3 and M30 which corresponds to all the currency (bills and
coins), deposits and other liabilities in foreign currency only. Certainly this is
not the ideal thing to do, but it is the best I can do, since there is no data of
foreign money for transactions.
The monetary policy that has been conducted in Bolivia in the last ﬁfteen
years is not exactly an Inﬂation Targeting regime, although the main objective
of the Central Bank is to control inﬂation at low levels. The Central Bank
has been very successful in attaining this task and inﬂation has been under
8% per year in the last years. The Central Bank followed a rule based in the
management of the International Reserves and the control variable was the Net
Internal Credit (CIN), but every year has deﬁned a goal for inﬂation and the
goal for the last year was a 5 percent inﬂation rate. Thus, I use this goal as
the inﬂation target, so π =0 .05 (yearly).16 Recently, the Central Bank has
published the ﬁrst Monetary Policy Report, where it states explicitly that the
Monetary Policy will be conducted towards an Inﬂation Targeting regime. In
this report, a 4% target for this year is explicitly deﬁned, but with a band
between 3% and 5%.
The ﬁscal policy is ﬁnanced through taxes and segniorage. The two tax
variables τkand τn are assumed to be constant, so they are treated as parameters
in the model and the main exercise here will be to change the value of the capital
t a xt oz e r oa sa no p t i m a lﬁscal policy would suggest. I use a value of 0.02 for
the labor tax which represents the transactions’ tax in the Bolivian economy;
and the value of 0.13 for the capital tax which corresponds to the Added Value
Tax (IVA).
With this information, we are left to solve the system of (39) to (48). The
second column of Table C1 in the appendix shows the steady-state values of the
benchmark economy. It can be seen that the devaluation rate is slightly higher





as the current account, a higher value of e means that there is a deﬁcit in the
current account. Nevertheless this is a new way to introduce dollarization and I
do not want to deepen on this issue. The proportion over GDP of this variable
15TGP=Economic Active Population/Population in age to work
16The corresponding goal for a quarter is 0.012272.
18is -0.0015, a negligible value.17
In appendix B, I present the main characteristics of the simulated benchmark
economy for a period of 1000 quarters. The tables show the correlations between
variables and the cross correlations with output. I do not want to focus in the
explanation of how the economy works, but those tables will be very helpful for
the explanations of how welfare gains appear under optimal policies.
5.3 Welfare under Optimal Fiscal Policy
Now we are ready to compare welfare under a real Bolivian economy and an
"optimal" Bolivian economy. I mean optimal in the sense that the ﬁscal policy
is being conducted in an optimal way, speciﬁcally as shown in the theoretical
section, the capital tax is set to zero (τk =0 ). The main characteristics of the
benchmark economy are that government expenditures are ﬁxed and the Taylor
rule is of the contemporaneous type.
Welfare under the optimal policy is measured using equation (29). For the














Solving for λ we obtain the following expression for the welfare cost associ-
ated with policy regime a vis-á-vis the reference policy regime r in percentage
terms.
welfare cost = λ × 100 =
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We calculate welfare cost for a non-stochastic economy (at steady-state),
using ﬁrst-order approximations and second-order approximations to the policy
function. The following table shows the results for the non-stochastic and sto-
chastic economy. For the latter, the initial conditions are given by the steady
state values of the deterministic economy.
Table 3: Welfare under Fiscal Policy
Contemporaneous Taylor Rule
Steady State Welfare Welfare Cost
τk =0 .13 -466.1365
τk =0 -455.7628 -3.62%
1st-order approximation -3.63%
2nd-order approximation -3.65%
17One can also interpret this part as a vintage capital.
19Notice, that as expected, there are welfare gains by shifting to an optimal
ﬁscal policy. The welfare gains in the deterministic economy are 3.62 percent of
consumption; for the stochastic economy using ﬁrst-order approximations the
gains are 3.63 percent; and for the economy with second-order approximations,
they are 3.65 percent. Notice that the welfare gains we compute are almost the
same, independent of using a ﬁrst or a second-order approximation. And they
are also the same if we are considering a non-stochastic or a stochastic economy.
So, an explanation for the deterministic economy is also valid for the stochastic
economy.
The welfare gains in the non-stochastic economy are realized by reducing
the capital tax to its optimal level, thus the capital in the economy increases.
Agents optimally substitute labor with capital, as the labor tax remains ﬁxed.
Of course the reduction in labor is not as high as the increase in capital. Labor
reduces to 0.62073 and capital increases by 23 percent, as shown in table C1 in
the appendix.
Notice that output increases by 7.18 percent. Consumption increases due
t ot h ei n c o m ee ﬀect and leads to a higher demand of domestic money. Clearly,
as the capital tax incomes for the government have decreased and government
purchases are ﬁxed, the government needs to ﬁnance its purchases in some way,
so it resorts to segniorage. In this way equilibrium is restored in the domestic
money market.
There is also a push to foreign money, more consumption leads also to a
higher demand for dollars. But notice, that dollars are ﬁx e di nt h em o d e l ,s oa
reduction in the devaluation rate is also needed to keep the demand of dollars
ﬁxed. This is a typical mechanism in small open economies, the exchange rate
always moves to restore the equilibrium.
The transmission mechanisms behind the welfare gains in the stochastic
economy are the same as in the deterministic economy. I ﬁnd that here, as in the
deterministic economy, output increases by 7 percent on average. Consumption
and investment increase, while labor decreases. These results are based on
means and medians as shown in table C2 in the appendix.
The third and four column of the table show the cyclical properties of the
baseline economy and the optimal economy, respectively. Notice that volatilities
increase for output, investment and the level of dollarization (DOL), in the
optimal case, while they decrease for consumption, labor and real balances in
domestic money.18 This result means that agents smooth consumption when
capital taxes are reduced to zero.
In summary, from the four variables that are arguments in the utility func-
tion, only dollars remain ﬁxed, while consumption, leisure and real balances in
domestic money increase with the optimal policy, leading to the welfare gain
reported above.
18The dollarization level (DOL) is deﬁned as the ratio of real balances in dollars over total
m o n e y( p e s o sp l u sd o l l a r s ) .
205.4 Welfare under Optimal Monetary Policy
The optimal monetary policy result developed in section four, states that the
government must satiate the economy with real balances, in order to reach a zero
nominal interest rate. In this environment, where government spending is ﬁxed,
generating a deﬂation means that the government will make an extensive use of
the money printing machine, and so people will enjoy inﬁnite real balances in
local money. Of course in a 2MIUF model, as in a MIUF model, this represents
an inﬁnite utility and so an inﬁnite welfare. So we can not get a precise measure
of welfare in this setting.
Therefore, I see only what happens if the yearly inﬂation rate is reduced,
say, by three percentage points. This reduction corresponds to a 0.8 percentage
points of reduction in the quarterly nominal interest rate. The welfare gains
are shown in table 4. Notice that there is no diﬀerence in gains between the
deterministic economy and the stochastic economy in any case, welfare gains
are 1.71 percent.
Table 4: Welfare under Monetary Policy
Contemporaneous Taylor Rule
Steady State Welfare Welfare Cost
π =0 .05 -466.1365
π =0 .02 -466.1115 -0.0084%
1st-order approximation -0.0084%
2nd-order approximation -0.0084%
These gains are small, when compared to gains associated with optimal ﬁscal
policy, and compared to other works. For example, Cooley and Hansen [9] in
a stochastic monetary economy, estimate the gains from eliminating moderate
inﬂation of 5 and 10 percent to zero inﬂation and ﬁnd gains in lifetime utility
of 0.4 and 0.6 percent. Cavalcanti and Villamil [3] in a model with currency
substitution, but without capital ﬁnd that the welfare gains from reducing in-
ﬂation from high levels, such as 25%, to the optimal level are very small (0.03
percent).19
The intuition for this result is simple. By reducing the inﬂation rate, there
are three eﬀects. First, by the Fisher equation, the nominal interest rate is
reduced in the same proportion as the reduction in inﬂation. Second, by the
equation of dollars demand, a reduction in inﬂation leads to a higher demand
of dollars. In order to stop this, the devaluation rate is reduced in the same
proportion as inﬂation. This allows the economy to maintain the stock of dollars
ﬁxed. Third, and the main eﬀect for welfare, is that a reduction in inﬂation leads
to higher real balances in domestic money. In fact they increase by 34 percent.
But of course real balances in local money are low weighted in the utility
function (θ =0 .26), so the impact on utility is lower and it is diminished by the
parameter ϕ.
19In a many times cited paper, Lucas [19] ﬁnds that the gains from removing business cycles
in the economy, are around 0.05 percent of permanent consumption.
21It can be seen in table C1, that the National Accounts ratios are not af-
fected by a reduction in inﬂation. In fact real variables are not aﬀected with
optimal monetary policies in this type of model, revisiting the classical result of
money neutrality. In the stochastic economy (see table C2), the eﬀects are the
same, only mean and median values of real balances in domestic money increase,
causing the level of dollarization to decrease.
It is also shown that the real balances in local money and the level of dol-
larization become more volatile with lower levels of inﬂation. The correlations
with output are also reported for each variable and all correlations are positive,
except for real balances in domestic money. The level of dollarization has the
higher correlation coeﬃcient (0.7) while labor has the lowest (0.14).
5.5 Welfare under Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy
Here, I analyze the welfare gains associated with both optimal ﬁscal and mon-
etary policy jointly. In other words I show how better is society is in terms of
permanent consumption, if the government reduces the capital income tax to
zero and at the same time, reduces the yearly inﬂation target to 2 percent. The
results in table 5 show that welfare gains under both optimal policies are the
highest. In the deterministic economy, welfare gains are in the order of 3.62
percent, while in the stochastic economy, they are in the order of 3.66 percent.
Table 5: Welfare under Fiscal and Monetary Policy
Contemporaneous Taylor Rule
Steady State Welfare Welfare Cost
τk =0 .13 and π =0 .05 -466.1365
τk =0and π =0 .02 -455.7378 -3.62%
1st-order approximation -3.64%
2nd-order approximation -3.66%
The last column of table C1 in the appendix presents the steady state values
for all the variables and conﬁrms our conclusion that welfare gains are mainly
driven by real balances in local currency. Notice that the impact on real variables
is exactly the same as when we were only considering a reduction in the capital
tax. The ratios of consumption and government spending over output reduce by
3.35 percent and 6.7 percent respectively, while investment over output increases
by 15 percent.
The reduction in the inﬂation target to 2 percent reduces the nominal interest
rate from 2.8 percent to 2 percent, exactly in the same magnitude as in the
case with optimal monetary policy only. The only variables that diﬀer with
the previous cases are the real balances in local money and the devaluation
rate. This means that the eﬀect comes from the currency demand equations
(equations 40 and 41 in the deterministic economy). Now the devaluation rate
has to decrease even more, because it has to compensate not only for the lower
inﬂation rate, but also for the higher level of consumption. The devaluation
rate reduces by 10 percentage points more than in the optimal monetary policy
22case and this allows the economy to keep steady-state real balances in dollars
at a value of 2.19.
By comparing the percentage increase of real balances in the three cases
analyzed here, we can see how big the impact of optimal policies is on this
variable. In the optimal ﬁscal policy case it was a 7 percent increase, in the
optimal monetary case it was a 34 percent increase and in this last case it is
a 44 percent increase. Naturally, this increase is explained by the reduction
in inﬂation and the expansion of consumption. These two eﬀects generate a
pressure in the demand of local currency, to which the government responds by
increasing its supply. So, agents have more domestic currency in their pockets,
and this produces felicity to them (more utility). Thus the ﬁnal eﬀect is an
important increase in welfare.
The same mechanism of transmission applies to the stochastic economy.
The last column of table C2 in the appendix, shows that output, consumption,
investment and labor follow the same pattern as in the optimal ﬁscal policy case.
There is a high increase of real balances, not only in terms of the mean and
the median, also in terms of the standard deviation. Again, as dollars remain
ﬁxed and real balances in local currency increase, broad money increases and
the dollarization level decreases to 77 percent. The volatility of this level also
increases from 0.0075 to 0.013.
5.6 Sensitivity Analysis
It is important to consider money in the utility function, when one is analyzing
welfare gains associated with particular policies, if these gains come primarily by
the increase of real balances. The preceding results showed that the weight that
money could have in the utility function do matter in explaining this welfare
gains, so in this section I perform a sensitivity analysis with the parameter θ,
which represents the weight that real balances in domestic currency and dollars
have in the utility function.
The following ﬁgure shows the welfare gains associated with all the possible
values that we can assign to θ (range between 0 and 1) for the three exercises
considered, i.e. optimal ﬁscal policy, optimal monetary policy and both policies
considered jointly at the same time.
23Figure 1: Welfare Gains from Optimal Policies for Diﬀerent Values
of θ
The ﬁrst thing to note is that the curves for the cases in which optimal ﬁscal
policy is being considered are far away from the curve in which only monetary
policy is being considered. Second, the curves are almost ﬂat, which means
that welfare is not very sensitivity to the parameter θ,i np a r t i c u l a rw h e no n l y
optimal monetary policy is being considered. In that case, by increasing the
value of θ, the welfare gains can increase up to a maximum value of 0.035
percent. This value corresponds to the non-dollarized case and is very similar
to the magnitudes founded by Cavalcanti and Villamil [3].
When optimal ﬁscal policy is being considered, the curves are a little steeper
and welfare gains are considerable. Notice that the economy is able to enjoy high
welfare gains from both optimal policies applied jointly, but the main impact
comes from ﬁscal policy. If we assign all the weight to the domestic money
(θ =1 ) then the welfare gain is around 4.1 percent. Of course, since welfare
gains come from real balances in domestic currency, if we assign higher values
for it in the utility function, welfare gains will be higher. This is the reason why
t h ec u r v e sh a v en e g a t i v es l o p e s .A sθ increases, welfare gains also increase.
In this way, we can also establish a relation between partially dollarization
and welfare gains. As the country, in this case Bolivia, becomes more dollarized,
welfare gains associated with optimal policies are lower. In the opposite case,
welfare gains are higher. So, there is a negative relation between partially
24dollarization and welfare gains. Moreover, welfare gains depend mainly on ﬁscal
policy.
6C o n c l u s i o n
I have characterized optimal ﬁscal and monetary policy in a dynamic general
equilibrium model with currency substitution and capital. This model oﬀers
two important features. First, both monetary and ﬁscal policy are analyzed
jointly in a model where there is capital accumulation; and second it is a two-
monies-in-the-utility function (2MIUF) model. This characteristics turn out to
be important in obtaining the theoretical and empirical results.
The theoretical model implies that an optimal monetary policy must follow
the Friedman Rule, that is to set the nominal interest rate close to zero. In order
to reach this objective in the context of a policy guided by rules, it is necessary
to ﬁxat a r g e tf o rt h ei n ﬂation as low as possible. This will allow to satiate the
economy with real balances, in fact a deﬂation is needed to reach this objective
completely. Then, the optimality of the ﬁscal policy advices the capital income
tax be set at zero. This is a steady-state result, but also a dynamic result that
holds in the transition to the long-run.
The only diﬀerence between the traditional Ramsey problem in a one cur-
rency model, and this model, is that here there is a ﬁrst-order condition for
dollars where the inﬂation and devaluation rates appear. This converts the
Ramsey problem, into a not only real variables problem. Prices are also now
involved in the system. I do not characterize numerically the Ramsey problem,
instead I compute the welfare gains associated with the optimal policies that
are an implication of the solution to the Ramsey problem.
Certainly, this paper revisits the ﬁrst results on this literature using a very
simple model, although now the mode is to analyze these issues in new-keynesian
frameworks. Nevertheless, the contribution of this paper is important, if one
thinks that traditional results have been proved for partially dollarized economies
and also important empirical results are obtained, using the second-order ap-
proximation technique developed by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe[24] to obtain the
policy rules.
The numerical results can be attributed to partially dollarized economies,
because I have been very careful to calibrate the model for a real partially dol-
larized economy, which is the Bolivian economy. Other papers have calibrated
monetary models with currency substitution, but using standard parameter val-
ues.20
I calibrate the model for Bolivia, using quarterly data for the period 1990-
2005. There are few models calibrated for Bolivia, and the most are in the old
tradition of computational general equilibrium (CGE) models (see Thiele and
Wiebelt [27] for a recent model). The only RBC model corresponds to Quiroz,
et.al.[26] which is more than ten years old. So, this paper is also a contribution
f o rt h i st y p eo fm o d e l sf o rB o l i v i a .
20See Cavalcanti and Villamil[3]
25The most important result of the empirical section is that welfare gains under
optimal ﬁscal policy are higher than the gains under optimal monetary policy.
The case in which I analyze optimal ﬁscal and monetary policy jointly shows
clearly that the main impact come from the ﬁscal side. The presence of capital
and money in the same model also reinforce this eﬀect, because all real variables
move towards higher levels of welfare. The economy can enjoy higher levels of
welfare by reducing the capital tax to zero than by reducing the inﬂation target.
The following results are obtained for welfare gains: 3.65 percent of current
consumption (permanent) when capital tax is zero, 0.0084 percent when the
inﬂation target is reduced to 2 percent; and 3.66 percent when both the capital
tax is reduced to zero and the inﬂation target is reduced to 2 percent which is
very similar to the case where only ﬁscal policy is considered. These gains cor-
respond to a stochastic Bolivian economy and are the same for the deterministic
economy.
An important conclusion is that there is a negative relation between the
weight that dollars have in the utility function and the welfare gains. This is
another way to say that there is a negative relation between dollarization and
welfare gains. Doing a sensitivity analysis with the parameter that weights
currencies in the utility function, I ﬁnd that for higher values of the weight of
real balances in local currency, higher welfare gains can be obtained with an
optimal ﬁscal policy, but not very high with optimal monetary policy. When
considering both policies at the same time, welfare gains can go from a value of
3.5 percent to a value of 4.1 percent.
This work leaves open some lines for future research. It would be interesting
to characterize exactly the Ramsey policies, this means that taxes might be
endogeneized, in order to see its cyclical movements. I am sure that the standard
results would hold: capital taxes will be very close to zero and labor taxes
would be smooth. This is also a neoclassical model. It would be interesting
to modify the model introducing sticky prices and imperfect competition to see
if the results related to welfare and money neutrality still appear. Finally and
particularly interesting for the Bolivian economy, the model could be used to
inspect all kind of policy implications. For example, it could be used to analyze
the impact of an increase in the capital tax, assuming that there is one sector
that is intensive in this input (the hydrocarbons sector).
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28Appendix
Appendix A: Optimality of the Friedman Rule
Here I explain in detail the proof of the Friedman rule.
u(ct,m t,d t,1 − nt)=U(H(ct,m t,d t),1 − nt)
Vm(t)=0implies: (1+Φ)u m(t)+Φ[ucm(t)ct + umm(t)mt + udm(t)dt − unm(t)nt]=
0
Vc(t)=θt implies: (1+Φ)u c(t)+Φ[ucc(t)ct + umc(t)mt + udc(t)dt − unc(t)nt]=
θt
uc(t)=UH(H(ct,m t,d t),1 − nt)Hc
um(t)=UH(H(ct,m t,d t),1 − nt)Hm
ud(t)=UH(H(ct,m t,d t),1 − nt)Hd
then
uc(t)ct+um(t)mt+ud(t)dt = UH(H(ct,m t,d t),1−nt)[Hcct + Hmmt + Hddt]
uc(t)ct + um(t)mt + ud(t)dt = UHH (by homogeneity)
Then the second derivatives are:
uc(t)+ucc(t)ct + ucm(t)mt + ucd(t)dt = UHHHcH + UHHc
we can cancel uc(t)=UHHc
ucc(t)ct + ucm(t)mt + ucd(t)dt = UHHHcH
and similarly
ucm(t)ct + umm(t)mt + udm(t)dt = UHHHmH
then we have:
(1 + Φ)UHHm + Φ[UHHHmH − UHnHmn]=0
(1 + Φ)UHHc + Φ[UHHHcH + UHnHcn]=θt
Appendix B: Benchmark economy: Bolivian economy
In this appendix I want to show some characteristics of the general equilibrium
model calibrated for Bolivia. Recall that the benchmark characteristics are:
τk =0 .13 and π =0 .05 (yearly).
29Table B1: Model simulations: Correlations
k π e i d A g c l n m
k 1
π 0.936 1
e 0.686 0.832 1
i 0.74 0.876 0.962 1
d 0.252 0.09 0.013 -0.099 1
A -0.027 -0.036 0.284 0.24 -0.026 1
g -0.003 -0.004 0.022 0.022 0.021 0.027 1
c 0.878 0.751 0.57 0.553 0.662 0.113 0.008 1
l 0.618 0.486 0.181 0.152 0.777 -0.482 -0.006 0.769 1
n -0.618 -0.487 -0.181 -0.153 -0.777 0.482 0.006 -0.769 -1 1
m -0.192 -0.433 -0.684 -0.745 0.666 -0.334 -0.019 0.12 0.504 -0.504 1
Table B2: Cross Correlations with output
Cross correlation of output with
x(-3) x(-2) x(-1) x x(+1) x(+2) x(+3)
Output 0.99632 0.99749 0.99869 1 0.99869 0.99749 0.99632
Consumption 0.99613 0.99718 0.99826 0.99936 0.99834 0.99732 0.99628
Investment 0.86514 0.8675 0.87029 0.87281 0.87237 0.87239 0.87197
Level of Doll. 0.9963 0.9973 0.99834 0.99938 0.99835 0.99734 0.9963
Labor 0.99598 0.99701 0.99807 0.99919 0.99813 0.99711 0.99608
Domestic M. 0.99169 0.9928 0.99399 0.99528 0.99469 0.99403 0.99332
Inﬂation 0.95732 0.9578 0.95787 0.95852 0.95681 0.95504 0.95326
Devaluation 0.98951 0.99035 0.991 0.99156 0.98997 0.98846 0.98693
Interest Rate 0.99491 0.99581 0.99668 0.99739 0.996 0.99466 0.99331
Technology 0.99607 0.99723 0.99843 0.99973 0.99851 0.9974 0.9963
Government 0.99537 0.9963 0.99734 0.99839 0.99749 0.99654 0.99549
Appendix C: Welfare Comparisons
I analyze the welfare gains associated with optimal ﬁscal and monetary policy
for a deterministic and stochastic Bolivian economy.
30Table C1: Deterministic Economy Comparisons
Variable τk=0 .13/π =0 .05 τk=0 π =0 .02 τk=0 /π =0 .02
Consumption 0.21502 0.22274 0.21502 0.22274
Leisure 0.3791 0.37927 0.3791 0.37927
Labor 0.6209 0.62073 0.6209 0.62073
Real balances in domestic currency 0.44194 0.47421 0.59437 0.63778
Real balances in dollars 2.1978 2.1978 2.1978 2.1978
Capital 2,4148 2.975 2.4148 2.975
Inﬂation rate 0.012272 0.012272 0.0049629 0.0049629
Devaluation rate 0.012429 0.011265 0.0051184 0.0039632
Nominal interest rate 0.028359 0.028359 0.020934 0.020934
Gov. purchases 0.032501 0.032501 0.032501 0.032501
Technology 0.30119 0.30119 0.30119 0.30119
GDP 0.29409 0.31522 0.29409 0.31522
Consumption/GDP 0.73113 0.70661 0.73113 0.70661
Gov. Purchases/GDP 0.11051 0.10311 0.11051 0.10311
Investment/GDP 0.15951 0.18335 0.15951 0.18335
Level of Dollarization 0.83258 0.82253 0.78713 0.77508
Table C2: Stochastic Economy Comparisons
τk=0 .13/π =0 .05 τk=0 π =0 .02 τk=0 /π =0 .02
Mean 0.29527 0.31619 0.29527 0.31619
Output Median 0.29543 0.31644 0.29543 0.31644
Stand.Dev. 0.01186 0.012156 0.01186 0.012156
Corr. with output 1 1 1 1
Mean 0.21481 0.22247 0.21481 0.22247
Consumption Median 0.21493 0.22259 0.21493 0.22259
Stand.Dev. 0.006683 0.0061518 0.006683 0.0061518
Corr. with output 0.5202 0.4695 0.5202 0.4695
Mean 0.047611 0.058433 0.047611 0.058433
Investment Median 0.046646 0.057739 0.046646 0.057739
Stand.Dev. 0.027102 0.027775 0.027102 0.027775
Corr. with output 0.21893 0.25664 0.21893 0.25664
Mean 0.83316 0.82292 0.7876 0.77532
Dollarization Median 0.83303 0.82264 0.78727 0.77476
Stand.Dev. 0.007554 0.0076512 0.013698 0.013228
Corr. with output 0.62119 0.60185 0.70631 0.69681
Mean 0.62175 0.62149 0.62175 0.62149
Labor Median 0.62186 0.62143 0.62186 0.62143
Stand.Dev. 0.007916 0.0074274 0.007916 0.0074274
Corr. with output 0.14497 0.24738 0.14497 0.24738
Mean 0.44029 0.47299 0.59356 0.63758
Real balances in Median 0.43932 0.47246 0.59 0.63435
domestic money Stand.Dev. 0.03143 0.031206 0.056902 0.055997
Corr. with output -0.48557 -0.50824 -0.61417 -0.62539
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